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1. Introduction 
While monetary policy objectives are expressed in terms of macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation and real output, policy actions affect these variables indirectly and with a lag. On the other 
hand, financial markets tend to react quickly to the release of new information. Thus, the use of 
financial data should help to identify a more direct and immediate effect of changes in monetary 
policy and improve our understanding of the transmission mechanism since asset prices play a key 
role in several channels. Among asset prices, stock prices are typically closely monitored and are 
commonly regarded as being highly sensitive to economic news. 
As Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) point out, when establishing the link between monetary 
policy changes and stock returns one should account for the possibility that anticipated policy actions 
may have already been incorporated by market participants into their investment decisions. Bernanke 
and Kuttner (2005) use Kuttner’s (2001) futures methodology to decompose the federal funds rate 
changes into expected and unexpected and find that an unanticipated monetary policy tightening 
exerts a negative impact on the US stock market. Bredin et al. (2007) adopt a similar empirical 
approach using UK data and find that unanticipated policy changes have a significant impact on both 
aggregate and the majority of the sixteen sectoral stock returns that they employ.     
In this paper we examine the impact of anticipated and unanticipated actions by the Bank of 
England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), on UK aggregate and sectoral stock returns. The 
monetary policy shock is generated from the change in the three-month sterling LIBOR futures 
contract at the time of the MPC meeting and the sample period runs from June 1999 to November 
2009. Unlike Bredin et al. (2007), we utilise both time-series and panel regression analysis. In the 
context of the latter, we utilize both the cross sectional and time series properties of the data as well as 
encapsulate possible endogeneity and joint determination by employing a GMM panel estimator, in 
addition to the standard OLS panel estimator. Moreover, we incorporate a higher level of sectoral 
disaggregation to estimate the impact of monetary policy announcements on the UK stock market.   3
Finally, we are the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to investigate the possibility of a 
structural break in the relationship between interest rate changes and stock returns around the recent 
credit crunch. Our results are interesting and novel indicating a significant change in the nature of the 
stock market response to monetary policy shifts since August 2007. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the stock market data 
and the calculation of the monetary policy shock. Section 3 presents the empirical models and results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data   
  Our sectoral stock returns dataset covers seventy FTSE Industrial sub-sectors which form the 
ten basic UK industries: oil & gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, healthcare, consumer 
services, telecommunications, utilities, financials, and technology. We measure stock returns for sub-
sector i at day t that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets, yit,, as the first difference of the 
natural log of the daily closing stock price (Sit):  ,1 100*(ln ln ) it it i t yS S − = − . Aggregate stock returns, 
yt
agg
, are measured as the first difference of the natural log of the daily closing value of the FTSE 100 
index (FTSEt):  1 100*(ln ln )
agg
tt t y FTSE FTSE − =− .  
Following Kuttner (2001), we use data from interest rate futures contracts in order to derive 
the monetary policy shock. In the UK, there is no futures contract tracking the MPC-controlled policy 
instrument (such as the two-week repo rate used in US-based studies). The closest substitute that 
exists, and which we use, is a futures contract based upon the three-month LIBOR rate, and this rate  
is widely accepted as a very good indicator of market expectations of future policy changes.
1 Thus, 
the monetary policy shock, 
u i Δ , is proxied by the change in the rate of the three-month sterling 
                                                 
1 The futures contract is based on the British Bankers’ Association London Interbank Offered Rate (BBA LIBOR) for 
three month sterling deposits at 11:00 on the last trading day.  The settlement price is 100 minus the BBA LIBOR rounded 
to three decimal places. Lindholdt and Wetherilt (2004) employ LIBOR rates at various maturities and find that there has 
been a clear improvement in the ability of the market to forecast policy rate changes by the Bank of England.   4
LIBOR futures contract as traded on the Euronext/LIFFE market, relative to the day before the 
(monthly) MPC meeting: 
,, 1
u
tm t m t if f − Δ= −            ( 1 )  
where  , mt f  is the implied futures rate (100 minus the futures contract price) associated with the 
contract that expires on the month that the MPC meets.
2 Finally, we measure the expected change in 
interest rates, 
e i Δ , as the actual change in the three-month LIBOR rate minus the surprise: 
 
eu
tt t ii i Δ= Δ − Δ          ( 2 )  
The sample period under investigation is June 1999 – March 2009, providing us with 119 
MPC meetings, which will be the time-series dimension in the panel analysis.
3 
 
3.  Econometric models and results 
 
3.1  Time-series models: Aggregate returns 
We start our empirical investigation by regressing FTSE 100 returns on expected and 
unexpected interest rate changes: 
agg e e u u
tt t t yi i e αβ β =+Δ+ Δ+        ( 3 . 1 )  
where the error term, et,  represents factors other than monetary policy that affect the stock market on 
event days.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                 
2 For example, to calculate the monetary policy shock associated with the 9/06/2005 MPC meeting, we use the rate 
implied by the three-month LIBOR futures contract that expires on 13/06/2005. Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005), in their analysis of US monetary announcements adjust the federal funds rate for the number of days remaining in 
the month. This is necessary in their case because they use the federal funds futures rate, the settlement of which is based 
upon the average fed funds rate of the last month in the futures life. We do not adjust our LIBOR rates for the number of 
remaining days in month because in the UK the 3 month LIBOR futures settles at the 3m-libor of the last trading day. 
3 The particular start date was chosen to take into account two constraints. First, the Monetary Policy Committee meetings 
commenced on June 1997, and second, prior to June 1999 the Libor future contracts did not have delivery date for each 
month of the year. Bredin et al. (2007) use an earlier start date (1993-2004), which makes the pre-June 1997 analysis hard 
to interpret given the lack of scheduled monthly meetings.    5
The OLS results in column 2 of Table 1 indicate that the estimated stock market response to 
both the expected and surprise component of monetary policy changes is statistically insignificant. 
Model 3.1 does not appear to be well specified since the residuals suffer from both heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Visual inspection of the residual series from this model indicates the presence 
of two very large negative outliers on August 2002 and October-November 2008.  These extreme 
observations are associated with the stock market downturns of 2002 and 2008. Particularly, late in 
the summer of 2002 the ‘dot-com’ bubble burst started reaching its final stage, while autumn 2008 
was characterized by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers at the peak of the credit crunch. To account 
for these outliers, we augment Model 3.1 by including two additive dummy variables: 
12 2002
agg e e u u
tt t t t t y DLehman D i i e αγ γ β β =+ + +Δ+ Δ+      (3.2) 
where DLehmant is equal to 1 during October-November 2008 and 0 otherwise, and D2002t is equal 
to 1 on August 2002 and 0 otherwise. 
From Table 1 column 3 we notice that the fit of the model improves considerably with the 
adjusted  R
2 increasing by 31%, while the residuals are now free of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation.  Apart from the two additive dummy variables, which are highly significant, only one of 
the monetary policy change variables is significant, the expected component, and that at the 10% level 
only. The surprise component effect, while exhibiting a negative sign in line with US evidence by 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), is not significantly different from zero.  These findings may be the 
result of structural instability in the stock market response to monetary policy changes. Indeed, from 
the onset of the credit crisis on August 2007 onwards, equity market participants have witnessed 
decreasing valuation in tandem with sharp cuts in interest rates. This suggests a positive, as opposed 
to the typically negative, association between stock market returns and interest rate changes. In order 
to account for possible structural change during the financial crisis we interact the expected and 
unexpected components of monetary policy changes with a (multiplicative) dummy variable:   6
12 1 2 2002 ( ) ( )
agg e e u u
tt t t t t t t y DLehman D DCrisis i DCrisis i e αγ γ β δ β δ =+ + + + Δ+ + Δ+ (3.3) 
where DCrisist is equal to 1 from August 2007 onwards and 0 otherwise. 
The results in Table 1 column 4 are interesting and novel. The adjusted R
2 increases to 43% 
and, excluding the constant, all variables are statistically significant at the 5% level or less. The stock 
market response to both expected and unexpected interest rate changes is negative. Hence, our results 
are similar to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) regarding the latter, but differ from them regarding the 
former. The pre-credit crunch results imply a −3.26% one-day return in response to a 50 basis points 
surprise rate increase.
4 However, during the credit crunch the estimated coefficient of both surprise 
and expected changes is positive. This suggests that monetary policy makers have not been able so far 
to boost stock markets by interest rate cuts highlighting the severity of the current financial turmoil. 
 
3.2  Time-series models: Sectoral returns 
  Our analysis has so far considered the response of a broad stock index to monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to examine the stock market reaction across different sectors in 
order to examine if any interesting patterns arise. Thus, we estimated Model 3.3 for each of the 70 
sectors in our dataset. Overall, the sectoral results are similar to the broad index based results in terms 
of the signs of the estimated coefficients, indicating a negative (positive) reaction on average to 
interest rate changes before (during) the credit crunch.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
As we see in Figure 1, which plots the histogram of the estimated sectoral coefficients, around 
80% of the expected and surprise-related coefficients are negative before the credit crunch.  During 
the financial crisis, however, more than three quarters of estimated coefficients are positive indicating 
                                                 
4 We repeated the analysis using the FTSE All Share returns and the results (available upon request) were very similar. 
Moreover, we augmented Model 3.3 by including DCrisis in an additive manner. Results (available upon request) were 
very similar.   7
an important change in the nature of the stock market response to policy shifts. Some interesting 
differences across the sectors include the case of nine industries where their response to (expected and 
unexpected) policy shifts before the credit crisis is opposite to average behavior.
5 Also, there are 
twelve sectors which exhibit negative response to (expected and unexpected) policy shifts during the 
crisis.
6 These findings suggest that portfolio diversification opportunities, with respect to monetary 
policy changes, are not very common but nevertheless do exist. 
 
3.3 Panel  models 
For completeness, we estimate the relationship between monetary policy and stock returns at a 
sectoral level using panel estimators. We first consider the OLS fixed effects model: 
'
it i it it ye α =+ + X θ            ( 4 )  
 
where  it y is defined as above,  i α  is the time-invariant unobserved sector-specific fixed effect , it X  is 
the vector of the explanatory variables and θis a vector of coefficients. We examine two alternative 
cases regarding the explanatory variables vector in Eq. (4). In Model 4.1 it includes the variables of 
Model 3.3, while in Model 4.2 we add the lagged dividend yield (dyit-12) in order to examine the 
robustness of our results with respect to the presence of an additional control variable related to the 
financial position of each sub-sector.
7 
One potential drawback with the OLS model is that it does not deal with the likely presence of 
endogeneity in our data. Although an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator would address such 
                                                 
5 These sectors are utility companies, environmental services, gambling and casino facilities, industrial machinery and 
factory equipment, employment services, producers and distributors of pens, paper goods, light bulbs, batteries and 
cleaning products, insurance brokers, gas distributors to end users and tobacco.  
6 These sectors are environmental services, producers and distributors of pens, paper goods, light bulbs, batteries and 
cleaning products, manufacturers and distributors of various durable household goods, soft drinks, insurance brokers, 
property and casualty insurance, tobacco, home improvement retailers, apparel retailers, medical supplies, utility 
companies and food products. 
7 Bredin et al. (2007) also augment their baseline time-series regression models using, however, not financial position 
variables but other variables including aggregate stock returns in selected European countries and the exchange rate.    8
endogeneity it, in turn, fails to capture the cross-sectoral heterogeneity in our data set. Therefore, in 
order to tackle both the endogeneity and cross-sectoral heterogeneity in the data we use a GMM 
estimator. Specifically we use the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which 
makes use of internal instruments for each time period to tackle endogeneity.  
If  () 0 it iz Eee =  holds for  zt ≠  across all the sectors then it represents the following moment 
conditions:  
() , 0 it z i t Ey e − Δ=  for  2;    3,......., . zt T ≥=         ( 5 )  
 
If  it X are weakly exogenous then we also have the following additional moment conditions: 
() , 0 it z i t EX e − Δ=  for  2;    3,......., . zt T ≥=         ( 6 )  
 
The single equation GMM panel estimator generally specifies a dynamic panel model in first 
differences and exploits the above moment conditions.
8 Therefore, the lagged (two time periods or 
more) levels of endogenous and weakly endogenous variables of the model become appropriate 
instruments for addressing endogeneity. The GMM panel estimator provides consistent coefficient 
estimates. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The panel estimation results are presented in Table 2. Using OLS, the fixed effects of the 
panel are significant at the 10% only when the lagged dividend yield is added (Model 4.2), while with 
GMM fixed effects are significant across both specifications. The Sargan test results confirm the 
validity of the instruments in the GMM model. OLS and GMM estimates of Models 4.1 and 4.2 
provide similar results which are in line with the broad index findings. Particularly, the stock market 
response to both expected and unexpected interest rate changes is significantly negative before the 
                                                 
8 The model is transformed into first differences in order to eliminate the fixed effects.    9
credit crunch and positive throughout it. The additive dummy variables associated with the stock 
market downturns of 2002 and 2008 are statistically significant. Finally, the lagged dividend yield 
coefficient is positive and significant which is in conformity with the literature on the predictability 
on stock returns where higher dividend yield is associated with higher future returns (see e.g. 
Campbell et al., 1997).  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the impact of anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy 
announcements of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on UK aggregate and 
sectoral stock returns. The monetary policy shock is generated from the change in the three-month 
sterling LIBOR futures contract for a sample period from June 1999 to March 2009. Using time-series 
and panel regression models we show that both the expected and unexpected components of monetary 
changes impact significantly on stock returns. Our results document an important structural break in 
the stock market reaction to monetary policy changes since the onset of the credit crisis. While before 
the crisis the stock market responds negatively to higher interest rates, the stock returns-interest rate 
change relationship becomes positive during the credit crunch. The latter finding indicates that, so far, 
highly expansionary monetary policy has not been able to reverse the negative trend in stock prices 
highlighting the severity of the ongoing crisis. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: OLS estimates, FTSE 100 returns. 
Variable  Model 3.1  Model 3.2  Model 3.3 
constant  -0.22 (1.9) *  -0.13 (1.34)  -0.1 (1.00) 
DLehmant  -  -5.5 (6.48) ***  -5.34 (4.94) *** 
D20002t  -  -4.83  (4.67) ***  -4.96 (4.93) *** 
e
t i Δ   -2.87 (1.01)  -4.08 (1.75) *  -8.17 (3.1) *** 
DCrisist*
e
t i Δ   -  -  14.74 (2.98) *** 
u
t i Δ   2.97 (1.02)  -3.3 (1.3)  -6.52 (2.27) ** 
DCrisist*
u
t i Δ   -  -  12.18 (2.22) ** 
Diagnostics     
Adjusted R
2  0.08 0.39 0.43 
Q(1)  4.837 **  0.098  0.186 
Q
2(1)  10.604 ***  0.314  0.219 
Het  4.475 **  0.507  0.303 
 
NOTES: This table reports OLS estimates of Models 3.1-3.3 over the time period June 1999-March 2009 (119 MPC 
meetings). Figures in parentheses represent the absolute value of the t-statistic associated with the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero. Q,  Q
2 denote the Ljung-Box Q,  Q
2 test statistics for serial correlation and ARCH-type 
volatility clustering. Het is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test statistic for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.   12
Table 2: Panel estimates, sectoral stock returns. 
OLS GMM  Variable 
Model 4.1  Model 4.2  Model 4.1  Model 4.2 
constant  -0.14 (5.91) ***  -0.39 (5.6) ***  -0.13 (4.66) ***  -0.11 (4.03) *** 
DLehmant  -3.61 (13.35) ***  -3.5 (13.18) **  -3.79 (11.62) ***  -3.62 (11.56) *** 
D20002t  -2.63 (10.47) ***  -2.58 (10.48) ***  -3.13 (10.13) ***  -2.78 (9.46) *** 
e
t i Δ   -4.66 (7.07) ***  -4.71 (7.09) ***  -4.11 (5.56) ***  -4.01 (5.67) *** 
DCrisist*
e
t i Δ   9.81 (7.93) ***  9.6 (7.85) ***  8.12 (5.61) ***  7.65 (5.01) *** 
u
t i Δ   -4.11 (5.73) ***  -2.39 (3.04) ***  -3.58 (4.08) ***  -3.32 (4.16) *** 
DCrisist*
u
t i Δ   8.21 (5.98) ***  6.49 (4.68) ***  5.43 (3.32) *** 5.12  (3.05) *** 
dyit-12  -  0.07 (3.55) ***  -  0.06 (2.82) *** 
Diagnostics       
i α   [0.43]  [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] 
Sargan 
2() r χ   - -  [0.49]  [0.55] 
 
NOTES: This table reports panel estimates of Models 4.1 and 4.2 over the time period June 1999-March 2009 (119 MPC 
meetings) across 70 sectors. Figures in parentheses represent the absolute value of the t-statistic associated with the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.  Sargan tests follow the X
2 distribution with r degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments. The endogenous explanatory variables in the panel are GMM instrumented setting    
z ≥3 . αi are fixed effects. [.] are p values***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively. 
   13
Figure 1: Histograms of OLS sectoral estimates. 
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NOTES: These figures show the histograms of the estimated sectoral coefficients from Model 3.3. The header above each 
figure denotes the variable corresponding to the aforementioned coefficient. 